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SECURITY DEVICES AS PREFERENCES UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT
EVERETr H. SNEDEKER*
The complete revision of our Bankruptcy Law in 1938 brought no more
sweeping change than the entire recasting of the Section relating to prefer-
ences.1 This change was wrought mainly by defining the time at which
transfers made by the bankrupt were to be considered complete. Aiming
at the hitherto commercially valuable doctrine of "relation back,"2 the new
Act states: ".... a transfer shall be deemed to have been made at a time when
it became so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor
and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property
so transferred superior to the ights of the transferee therein ... .
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. A.B. 1935, Marietta
College; LL.B. 1939, Columbia University.
1. Bankruptcy Act § 60, 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 96 (1940).
2. See infra.
3. Bankruptcy Act § 60, 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 96 (1940). Sec-
tion 60 (a) in full states: "A preference is a transfer, as defined in this Act, of
any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a -creditor for or on account
of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within
four months before the filing by or against him of the petition in bankruptcy, or
of the original petition under chapters X, XI, XII, or XIII of this Act, the effect
of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of
his debt than some other creditor of the same class. For the purposes of sub-
divisions (a) and (b) of this section, a transfer shall be deemed to have been made at
the time when it became so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from the
debtor and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property
so transferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein, and, if such transfer
is not' so perfected prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy or of the original
petition under chapter X, XI, XII or XIII of this Act, it shall be deemed to have
been made immediately before bankruptcy."
In order to constitute a voidable preference it is necessary to satisfy § 60 (b)
[52 STAT. 870 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 96 (1940)1: "Any such preference may be
avoided by the trustee if the creditor receiving it or to be benefited thereby or his
agent acting with reference thereto has, at the time when the transfer is made
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent. Where the preference is
voidable, the trustee may recover the property or, if it has been converted, its value
1
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Although not within the scope of this article a word should perhaps
be said about an academic controversy that has arisen over the question
of whether this Section (60 (a)), in effect, makes the trustee a bona fide
purchaser, or just gives him the status of the same as a criterion for meas-
uring his rights. It has been suggested, if not stated, by some of the most
eminent authorities in this field 4 that the former is the case. Equally eminent
authority5 has held to the latter view. Acceptance of the former interpreta-
tion would be, to use the words of the latter authority, revolutionary and
dangerous. "It would be revolutionary, because the trustee never enjoyed
that status previously, and it would be dangerous because a statute that
conferred upon the trustee the rights of an innocent purchaser for value
would cut off outstanding equities in cases where reclamation or other
equitable relief has hitherto been allowed against the estate as a matter
of course." 6 The problem has not yet beenpassed upon by the Supreme
Court.
The new Section seeks to strike down secret liens7 and appears to be
more comprehensive and more in accord with its contemplated purpose than
any previously devised. Although the Constitution guarantees to Congress
from any person who has received or converted such property, except a bona-fide
purchaser from or lienor of the debtor's transferee for a present fair equivalent
value: Provided, however, That where such purchaser or lienor has given less than
such value, he shall nevertheless have a lien upon such property, but only to the
extent of the consideration actually given by him. Where a preference by way of
lien or security title is voidable, the court may on due notice order such lien or
title to be preserved for the benefit of the estate, in which event such lien or title
shall pass to the trustee. For the purpose of any recovery or avoidance under this
section, where plenary proceedings are necessary, any State court which would have
had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened and any court of bankruptcy
shall have concurrent jurisdiction."
4. Mr. Hanna and Mr. McLaughlin have suggested the view that the new
Act makes the trustee a bona fide purchaser, See HANNA AND McLAUGHLIN, TiE
BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898 AS AMENDED INCLUDING THE CHANDLER AcT OF 1938
(1940); McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act(1937) 4 CHI. L. REV. 369, 393; Note (1941) 29 GEO. L. J. 628. It is now clear
that neither Mr. Hanna nor Mr. McLaughlin intended to propound such a view.
See Hanna, Some Unsolved Problems under Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act
(1943) 43 COL. L. REV. 58, 64, n. 23.
5. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES (rev. ed. 1940)
§ 488; Glenn, The Chandler Act and the Trustee as a Bona Fide Purchaser, a Supple-
mentary Note (1939) 25 VA. L. REV. 885.
6. Glenn, The Chandler Act and the Trustee as a Bone Fide Purchaser: a
Supplementary Note (1939) 25 VA. L. REV. 885 at 888-9. See also GLENN, FRAUD-
ULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES (rev. ed. 1940) 193. "On the contrary, he
takes the debtor's assets subject to outstanding equities; in other words, the trustee,
like every other liquidator 'stands in the shoes' of the bankrupt as to everything
except fraudulent conveyances and preferences."
7. See WEINSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY LAW OF 1938 (1938) at 120.
[Vol. 8
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SECURITY DEVICES IN BANKRUPTCY
and consequently the federal judiciary, control of bankruptcy," state law
must be applied where the federal law fails to give adequate and complete
coverageY It is thus left to the individual states to define the various terms
used but not explained in federal bankruptcy legislation, i.e., when a trans-
fer is perfected as against a bona fide purchaser.
CHATTrL MORTGAGES
Under the Bankruptcy Act, as it was construed prior to the Chandler
Act, the recording within the four months of a chattel mortgage which had
been executed before that period was held not to be a voidable preference
in those states where the recording acts declared an unrecorded mortgage
invalid only as against bona fide purchasers or lien creditors. By relating the
recording back to the execution of the mortgage the transaction was removed
from the operation of the law unless an individual creditor had fixed a lien
on the property before the recordation date, in which case'the trustee took
the place of that creditor and thus could overthrow the mortgagee's claim.1o
In those states, however, where the recording acts were construed to give
no effect to unrecorded chattel mortgages as against ordinary creditors, i.e.,
those not having a lien, the recording within the four month period was
held to constitute a voidable preference. 1
8. U. S. CONsT. Art I, § 8. Globe Bank and Trust Co. of Paducah,
Kentucky v. Martin, 236 U. S. 288 (1915) (provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
regarding attachments and liens acquired under state law are superior to all state
laws). In re Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 25 F. Supp. 988 (S. D. Cal. 1939)
(insolvency proceeding under state law is superseded by a proceeding under the
Bankruptcy Act). See also 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES
(rev. ed. 1940) at 867.
9. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353 (1925) (assignment valid under state
law); Sexton v. Kessler and Co., Ltd., 225 U. S. 90 (1912); In re De Luxe
Oil Co., 36 F. Supp. 287 (D. Minn. 1940). Cf. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64 (1938).
10. Martin v. Commercial National Bank of Macon, Georgia,,,245 U. S. 513
(1918) (decided under the Georgia Statute).
11. This construction was derived from the wording of § 60 (b) [36 STAT.
842 (1910), 11 U. S. C. § 96 (1934)] prior to the Chandler Act, under which
the trustee could avoid, as a preference, a mortgage which was recorded within the
four month period "if by law recording or registering thereof is required." Record-
ing was held to be "required" only where the recording act of the state declared
unrecorded mortgages to be invalid as against ordinary creditors, or those whose
place the trustee was entitled to take. Martin v. Commercial National Bank of
Macon, Georgia, 245 U. S. 513 (1918); Carey v. Donahue, 240 U. S. 430 (1916).
For a discussion of this rule and the cases see Note (1933) 83 A. L. R. 1279.
In 1926 § 60 (a) [44 STAT. 666, 11 U. S. C. § 96, (a), (1934)] was amended
to add the words "or permitted" to "if by law such recording or registering is re-
quired." Although the same words were not added to 60 (b) it was argued that
the addition would be meaningless unless, construed with 60 (b), it intended to
change the rule then prevailing so that recording within the four month period
1943]
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The rewording of Section 60 (a) in the Chandler Act would certainly
seem to make these transactions preferences. Yet in Adams v. City Bank
and Trust Company of Macon, Georgia,12 the court reached a decision, in
no respect different from the holdings under the previous Act. The bankrupt
had borrowed money from respondent bank on June 24, 1939, executing a
bill of sale of a certain chattel as security.'1 In exchange for a further loan,
the bankrupt on September 15, 1939, executed a bill of sale to the respond-
ent of another chattel held by it. Recordation did not take place until
December 18, 1939, at which time respondent had reasonable cause to believe
the bankrupt was insolvent. Adjudication of bankruptcy followed on De-
cember 30, 1939. The trustee sold the goods in the belief that the recorda-
tion constituted a voidable preference and suit was successfully maintained
for the proceeds by the bank. The court regarded the recording as only one
step necessary to make the transfer binding as to the subsequent purdhasers
and creditors. The transaction, considered as a whole, could not be regarded
as a preference because it was actually an exchange of equivalent consid-
erations and not payment of an antecedent debt.
The Act's definition of a transfer1 4 is broad enough to include the
recordation of a mortgage, and, as it took place some time after the con-
sideration had passed, it would seem that there has then been a transfer
on account of an antecedent debt.'- Before recordation the bankrupt had
an interest in the particular property sufficient to pass title to a bona fide
would constitute a voidable preference in whatever jurisdiction the recording took
place. See Foltz v. Davis, 68 F. (2d) 495, 496 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); In re Jackson,
9 F. Supp. 717, 723 (W. D. Ark. 1935). Contra: First National Bank of Lincoln,
Nebraska v. Live Stock National Bank, 31 F. (2d) 416 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); Bank
of Wadesboro v. Little, 71 F. (2d) 513 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934); see In re Cunning-
ham, 64 F. (2d) 296, 299 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
12. 115 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 699 (1941).
13. A bill of sale of goods, executed by a borrower of money in favor
of the lender, and defeasible on the loan's repayment is held to be a chattel mort-
gage in the absence of a change of possession. 1 JONES, CHATrEL MORTGAGES AND
CONDITIONAL SALES (6th ed. 1933) §§ 19, 22.
14. Section 1 (30) [52 STAT. 842 (1938), 11 U. S. C.- § 1, (30), (1940)]
defines transfer as including: ". . . the sale and every other and different mode,
direct or indirect, of disposing of or of parting with property or with an interest
therein or with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or upon
an interest therein, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involuntarily, by or
without judicial proceedings, as a conveyance, sale, assignment, payment, pledge,
mortgage, lien, encumbrance, gift, security or otherwise."
15. In. re Quaker City Sheet Metal Co., 129 F. (2d) 894 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942)
aff'd sub nom. Corn Exchange National Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder, 11 U. S.
LAW WEEK 4242 (U. S. 1943) (assignment of accounts receivable, no notice being
given to the debtor, was a transfer for an antecedent indebtedness at the time made
4
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purchaser or to have it subjected to the claims of a lien creditor. This inter-
est of the debtor in the property is taken from him when the mortgage is
recorded. The parting with such an interest would thus seem to constitute
a transfer within the Act. A construction of the transaction as fixing a
lien upon the property is also possible.' 6 In any event, a transfer has been
"suffered" for or on account of an antecedent debt. This conclusion is
supported by the legislative history of the Act.'
7
The historical development of the preference concept is an interesting
one, but beyond the scope of this article31 The legislative intent with
respect to the Chandler Act seems, however, to be soundly premised on this
historical development as well as on present policy. The doctrine of relation
back is believed to have had its origin in the early theory of a preference,
which was based upon an intent by the debtor to prefer one creditor over
others.'" No intent on the debtor's part was involved in the creditor's
re.cordation of the instrument he held, thus no preference took place. Today
intent on the part of debtor to prefer is of no consequence, the governing
factor being the depletion, before bankruptcy, of that part of the insolvent's
estate which could have been used to satisfy other creditors' claims. The
recording of a mortgage within the four month period, there being no
equivalent exchange at that time, deprives the debtor's estate of that much
complete, immediately before bankruptcy, and other requisites being present a
voidable preference. Court rejects interpretation of antecedent debt in Adams
case.) In re Seim Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 855 (D. Md. 1941). But cf.
Associated Seed Growers, Inc. v. Geib, 125 F. (2d) 683 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942).
In re Greenberg, 48 F. Supp. 3 (D. Mass..1942) (loan made December, 1939, but
chattel mortgage given in February, 1940 improperly recorded. Possession taken
on December 4, 1940, a day before bankruptcy, constituted other requisites
being present, a voidable preference). In re Markert, 45 F. Supp. 661 (D. Ct.
Mass. 1942) (same situation under recorded free handed mortgage of merchandise).
See also In re Aughenbaugh, 33 F. Supp. 671 (M. D. Pa. 1940) (mortgage executed
before the four month period and recorded within it held not a preference on the
ground that creditor, at time of recording, had no knowledge of debtor's insolvency;
the language of the court implied that the other elements of preference were pres-
ent). The Chandler Act would not seem to have been applicable as bankruptcy
occurred before the Act became effective. The provisions of the Act were applied,
however, the applicability of the Act seemingly not having been called in question.
See 52 STAT. 940 (1938).
16. See supra note 14. An alternative construction would lead to the same
result. "Parting with .. ". an interest therein" or "fixing a lien upon property" is
also broad enough to include the execution of a mortgage thereon.
17. H. R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 30; Hearings before
Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 8046, 75th Cong.,'1st Sess. (1937) 120 et seq.
See also McLaughlin supra note 4 at 392-3.
18. For an excellent treatment see 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND
PREFERENCES (rev. ed. 1940) §§ 378 et seq.
19. Glenn op. cit. at §§ 278-9, 382.
1943]
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in the way of assets that other creditors might have shared. This would
enable one creditor to obtain a greater percentage of the debt owed him than
his fellows, some of whom may have extended credit in reliance on the
debtor's owning just that asset. Such reliance by other creditors is not
necessary to have a voidable preference, but in most of the cases it is present.
To allow him to better his position after he has reason to believe the debtor
to be insolvent would be most unjust to other creditors where the means
existed for him to safeguard his lien in sufficient time to avoid the prohibition
of the statute.
The latter brings up the question of what should be regarded as suf-
ficient time to avoid the prohibition of the statute. To put it another way,
when should the transfer within the four month period be regarded as
"made for or on account of an antecedent debt." Where recordation takes
place the day following the execution of the instrument, it should 'not be
regarded as a preference, since leeway must need be given as they both
cannot take place simultaneously, and this is but a reasonable interval.21,
It would seem equally clear that the intervals of three and six months be-
tween the two dates in the Adams case are unreasonable and that the
transfers constituted preferences. To temper the harshness latent in this
Section the courts will undoubtedly have to expand or restrict their definition
of "antecedent debt" to accommodate the equities of each case.21
Where the mortgagee is not in possession and has not recorded at the
date of the filing of the petition, he will probably lose by operation of Sec-
tion 70 (C)22 without the necessity of the trustee proving a voidable pref-
erance under Section 60.
20. In the case of In re E. H. Webb Grocery Company, 32 F. Supp. 3 (M. D.
Tenn. 1940), only one day separated the dates of execution and recordation. The
latter date was within the four month period. Although holding that the transac-
tion did not constitute a preference, the court erroneously relies on Martin v. Com-
mercial National Bank of Macon, Georgia, 245 U. S. 513 (1918), which Section 60
of the Chandler Act was specifically intended to overrule. Hearings before Con-
mittee on the Idiciary on H. R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 124.
21. Matters that might well be considered in this connection are the length
of the interval, the reason for the delay in recording, the existence or non-existence
of intervening creditors, and the value of the consideration given for the lien.
22. Section 70 (c) [11 U. S. C. § 110, (c), (1940)] provides: ". . . The
trustee, as to all property in the possession or under the control of the bankrupt
at the date of bankruptcy or otherwise coming into the possession of the bank-
ruptcy court, shall be deemed vested as of the date of bankruptcy with all the
rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by legal or
equitable proceedings, whether or not such a creditor actually exists; and, as to all
other property, the trustee shall be deemed vested as of the date of bankruptcy
with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a judgment creditor then holding an
6
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Another problem presents itself with respect to the claims of artisans or
other persons who are often preferred over the claims of a prior conditional
sales vendor or chattel mortgagee despite recording or filing.2 3 Such holdings
are based upon an implied authority in the mortgagor or conditional sales
vendee.24 Other authorities refuse to find in the possession of the mortgagor
or conditional sales vendee any authority from the lien creditor to subject
the chattel in question to a lien for repairs or other services. 25 It would
execution duly returned unsatisfied, whether or not such a creditor actually exists."
This status given the trustee is not new but was substantially enacted in 1910.
See 36 STAT. 840 (1910). Although an unrecorded mortgage on conditional sales
contract is made complete as a transfer by virtue of Section 60 (a) "immediately
before bankruptcy" this is only for the purposes of (a) and (b) of that Section.
It is not complete as far as Section 70 (c) is concerned, and although the rights
given there to the trustee do not arise until bankruptcy they will be superior if
a lien creditor or judgment creditor, as the case may be, would have superior
rights to an unrecorded mortgage or conditional sales contract. Among the recent
cases see: In re Peairs Lynch Stone Co., 45 F. Supp. 992 (W. D. Mo. 1942) (trustee
in possession of chattel superior right by virtue of Section 70 (c) to vendor under
unrecorded conditional sales contract); In re Rigney, 45 F. Supp. 845 (W. D. Mo.
1942) (trustee with status as judgment creditor by virtue of 70 (c) superior right
to mortgagee under unrecorded mortgage). Where a pledgee fails to take possession
a similar result follows unless the pledgor was in possession for a limited purpose
only at the date of bankruptcy. Taplinger v. Northwestern Nat. Bank, 101 F. (2d)
274 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938). See supra note 51.
23. Weber Implement & Automobile Co. v. Pearson, 132 Ark. 101, 200 S. W.
273 (1917); New Britain Real Estate and Title Co. v. Collington, 102 Conn. 652,
129 Ad. 780 (1925); Etchen v. Dennis & Son Garage, 104 Kan. 241, 178 Pac.
408 (1919); Meyers v. Neeley & Ensor Auto Co., 143 Md. 107, 121 Ad. 916 (1923);
Guaranty Security Corp. v. Brophy, 243 Mass. 597, 137 N. E. 751 (1923); Broom
& Son v. Dale & Sons, 109 Miss. 52, 67 So. 659 (1915); Reeves & Co. v. Russell,
2 N. D. 265, 148 N. W. 654 (1914); BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) 482, 483,
484. Section 67 [11 U. S. C. § 107] provides: "Every lien against the property
of a person obtained by attachmtnt, judgment, levy, or other legal or equitable
process or proceedings within four months before the filing of a petition ...shall
be deemed null and void (a) if at the time when such lien was obtained such per-
son was insolvent . . ." By the provisions of (67) (3) the court may on due notice
order any such lien to be preserved for the benefit of the estate. However, liens
of the type here mentioned would seem to be protected for 67 (b) states: "The
provisions of Section 60 of this Act to the contrary notwithstanding, statutory liens
in favor of employees, contractors, mechanics, landlords, or other classes of persons,
and statutory liens for taxes and debts owing to the United States or any state or
subdivision thereof, created or recognized by the laws of the United States or of
any state, may be valid against the trustee, even though arising or perfected while
the debtor is insolvent and within four months prior to the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy. . . ." Common law possessory liens would not seem to be within
either of these sections and if contemporaneous transactions not preferences.
24. See cases cited supra note 22.
25. Campbell Motor Co. v. Stanfield, 214 Ala. 506, 108 So. 515 (1926);
Ehrlich v. Chapple, 311 Ill. 467, 143 N. E. 61 (1924); Indiana Truck Corp. of
Kentucky v. Hurry Up Broadway Co., 222 Ky. 521, 1 S. W. (2d) 990 (1928);
Metropolitan Securities Co. v. Orlow, 107 0. S. 583, 140 N. E. 306 (1923); Hart-
ford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Spofford, 126 Me. 392, 138 At. 769 (1927);
Small v. Robinson, 69 Me. 425, 31 Am. Rep. 299 (1879); Corinth Engine & Boiler
19431
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seem, however, that in jurisdictions implying such authority the creditor may
run a greater risk. Although he has recorded or filed his lien according to
state law four months before the petition or while the debtor was solvent,
he may not have perfected the transfer, for Section 60 (a) does not regard
the transfer as made until "no bona-fide purchaser from the debtor and no
creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so trans-
ferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein .... -120 If not "so per-
fected prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy... it shall be deemed
to have been made immediately before bankruptcy."' 27 In order that such
a preference may be avoided, it is necessary that the creditor receiving it
or to be benefited thereby have "at the time when the transfer is made, rea-
sonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent.'28 He may, of course,
not have such reasonable cause immediately before bankruptcy. To deprive
a man of his lien when he has done everything possible except, in effect, to
require a pledge by a transfer of possession would be an unjustified hardship
and would probably cause the discarding of this security device in states
Works v. Mississippi Central R. R., 95 Miss. 817, 49 So. 262 (1909); Whitlock
Machine Co. v. Holway, 92 Me. 414, 42 At. 799 (1899); General Motors Accept-
ance Corp. v. Sutherland, 122 Neb. 720, 241 N. W. 281 (1932); Shaw v. Webb,
131 Tenn. 173, 174 S. W. 273 (1915); Holt v. Schwartz (Tex. Civ. App.) 225
S. W. 856 (1920); Beecher v. Thompson, 120 Wash. 520, 207 Pac. 1056 (1922);
Scott v. Mercer Garage & Auto Sales Co., 88 W. Va. 92, 106 S. E. 425 (1921);
BROWN, op. cit. at 485, 486.
26. 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 96 (1940) supra note 3. To the effect
that the words "no bona fide purchaser and no creditor" in Section 60 are in the
alternative see In re Seim Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 855, 859 (D. Md. 1941);
In re Quaker City Sheet Metal Co., 129 F. (2d) 894, 897 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942). The
importance of tHis determination is obvious. There are many situations where the
transfer would be perfected against one and not the other. It must be admitted
that Section 1, which is concerned with definitions, contains no provision that con-junctive words may be interpreted as disjunctive and vice versa unless otherwise
required by the context. Even assuming such a rule of construction it is still not
free from doubt whether or not the context of Section 60a is meant to set up a
conjunctive rather than an alternative test. The discussion in the text is premised
on this alternative interpretation and should be kept in mind in the consideration
given to each security device. As the basis for holdings giving artisans or mechanics
superior rights is implied (often contrary to fact) authority from the mortgagee,
it can be argued that this should not render his interest imperfect (for bankruptcy
purposes) any more than if he personally hired the repair work.
27. Ibid. Bankruptcy with reference to time is defined thus: "... 'or bank-
ruptcy,' with respect to time, shall mean the date when the petition was filed."
Section 1 (13) [52 STAT. 840 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 1 (13) (1940)J.
28. 52 STAT. 870 (1938) 11 U. S. C. § 96 (b) (1940) supra note 3. It is
there provided that a preference (under Section 60) may be avoided by the trustee
if the creditor receiving it or to be benefited thereby has at the time when the
transfer is made reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent. For a
discussion of the meaning "reasonable cause" see GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONvEY-
ANCES AND PREFERENCES (rev. ed. 1940) § 409 and cases cited.
[Vol. 8
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having such a rule. Either the federal courts should apply this Section with
considerable latitude or such states should, it would seem, change their law
on this point.
There remain some difficult questions that arise when a mortgaged chat-
tel is removed to a second state without the knowledge or consent of the
foreign mortgagee. 29 As all but a very few jurisdictions3" protect the interest
of a foreign mortgagee against local attaching creditors of or bona fide pur-
chasers from the mortgagor, his lien should be good as against the trustee of
the bankrupt mortgagor." However, in some jurisdictions where a mechanic's
or materialman's lien is expressly given priority by local statute the lien is
usually held to be superior to a foreign mortgagee's interest because of the
added value to the chattel itselfA2 This might give the trustee of the mort-
29. The same problem may exist where the removal is from one county
to another county within a state. See UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 14 and
UNIFORM CHATTEL MORTGAGE ACr § 44.
30. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935), PA. ANNOT. (1936) § 268;
TEX. ANNOT. (1935) § 268. Colorado adopting this minority view, has refused
to enforce the claim of a vendor under a recorded, foreign conditional sales agree-
ment as against a purchaser for value without notice [Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo.
364, 201 Pac. 887 (1921); Commercial Credit Co. v. Higbee, 92 Colo. 346, 20 P.
(2d) 543 (1933)] but recognizes the validity of chattel mortgages recorded in
other states. Flora v. Julesburg Motor Co., 69 Colo. 238, 193 Pac. 545 (1920). It
has been suggested that the reason for this distinction may be the traditional
judicial hostility toward the conditional sales contract. See Note (1934) 6 ROCKY
MT. L. REV. 221, 222; HANNA, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SECURITY (2d ed. 1940)
at 272.
31. Shepard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449, 453 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Nuss, 196 So. 323 (La. Sup. Ct. 1940); Metro-Plan,
Inc. v. Kotcher-Turner, Inc., 296 Mich. 400, 296 N. W. 304 (1941); Hart v.
Oliver Farm Equipment Sales Co., 37 N. M. 267, 21 P. (2d) 96, 87 A. L. R. 962
(1933); Newsum v. Hoffman, 124 Tenn. 369, 137 S. W. 490 (1911); 2 BEALE, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS (1935) H§ 266, 268, 270, 271; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d
ed. 1938) § 154; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 268; ALA. ANNOT.
(1939) § 268; CAL. ANNOT. (1939) § 268; LA. ANNOT. (1937) § 268; Mo. ANNOT.
(1937) § 268; Miss. ANNOT. (1935) § 268; MD. ANNOT. (1937) § 268; N. Y. ANNOT.
(1935) § 268; OKLA. ANNOT. (1937) § 268; WASH. ANNOT. (1940) § 268; W. VA.
ANNOT. (1937) § 268. Whether this protection of the mortgagee or security holder
is a rule of common law or a rule of jurisdiction makes no difference, either way
the "title" or interest of the mortgagee is protected. For two interesing cases
reaching contrary holdings in a situation involving a triple situs see Fuller v.
Webster, 5 Boyce (Del.) 538, 95 Ail. 335 (1915); Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz.
408, 274 Pac. 155 (1928).
32. Willys Overland Co. of California v. Chapman, 206 S. W. 978 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1918); Snyder v. Yates, 112 Tenn. 309, 79 S. W. 796 (1903); 2 BEALE
op. cit. siupra note 18, § 279.2 (stating that the determinant is the value added);
JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES (6th ed. 1933) § 474; RE-
STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 268,_comment d; MD. ANNOT. (1937)
§ 268. Courts have with equal consistency denied priority where no value has been
added to the chattel itself. Smith's Transfer & Storage Co. v. Reliable Stores Corp.,
58 F. (2d) 511 (1932) (warehouseman's lien); Metzger v. Columbia Terminals
1943]
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gagor the right to avoid the mortgagor's lien for here again the transfer
was not so far perfected that no creditor could thereafter have acquired
any rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of the trans-
feree therein. 33 It would seem that as the mortgagee had perfected the
transfer, it should not be later considered imperfect for bankruptcy purposes
simply because its removal (without his knowledge) caused it to be subject
to this type of lien.34 Previous reasoning would also apply. If by operation
of Section 60 it is deemed perfected immediately before, bankruptcy then
the requirement of "reasonable cause"36 would appear almost insuperable,
for a man who does not know of his debtor's removal from the state will
generally not know of his insolvency. The same considerations apply where
a chattel sold under a conditional sales contract is removed from the state
without the consent or knowledge of the vendor.87
A harsh rule may be made even harsher in those jurisdictions that afford
no protection to a mortgagee or conditional sales vendor whose chattel has
been moved there without his consent.38 Although he records within a rea-
sonable time after knowledge it may be regarded as a preference if within
the four month period. Removal under such conditions should not make a
transfer once perfect imperfect within this Section. If the mortgage or con-
tract is not recorded at the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee will
generally prevail by virtue of the status conferred on him by Section 70 (c),
and it would be immaterial whether or not a voidable preference existed
under Section 60.39
Where a chattel is removed with the consent or knowledge of the
mortgagee, either at the time of its removal or later, protection is denied
against local attaching creditors of or bona fide purchasers from his debtor.40
To regard the transfer that was once perfect as now imperfect by reason of
Co., 227 Mo. App. 135, 50 S. W. (2d) 680 (1932) (carrier's lien). Alabama holds
that until the thirty days allowed for recordation have elapsed the lien of the
mortgagee shall be superior to all liens. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1939),
ALA. ANNOT. (1939) § 268. For a recent case subjecting a foreign mortgagee's in-
terest (where there had been a removal from the state without his knowledge)
to a tax lien in the second state, see First National Bank of Valentine, Neb. v.
Peterson, 67 S. D. 400, 293 N. W. 530 (1940).
33. 52 STAT. 869 (1938) 11 U. S. C. § 96 (a) (1940) supra notes 3, 26.
34. See note 23 supra.
35. See note 3 supra.
36. See note 28 supra.
37. But see note 46 infra.
38. See note 30 supra.
39. See note 22 supra.
40. In re Peairs Lynch Stone Co., 45 F. Supp. 992 (W. D. Mo. 1942);
[Vol. 8
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the failure to record within a reasonable period of time after knowledge
seems fair enough under these circumstances. The establishment of a void-
able preference under Section 60 will be unnecessary, however, where pos-
session or recording does not take place before the petition is filed. The
status given the trustee under Section 70 (c) will generally enable him
to prevail in this situation unless, of course, bankruptcy ensues within such
a short period of time after knowledge of removal that the creditor did not
have a reasonable period of time to record.41
There thus remains the question as to what amount of time such
a creditor should have in which to record (if necessary in the second state)
where knowledge of removal is subsequently acquired. Under the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act 42 and Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act43 the creditor is
given ten days after knowledge of removal to record, protection being ex-
tended meanwhile. Certainly some such reasonable time should be allowed.
Failure to record before the elapse of this period should and does result
in the loss of protection. As previously indicated, however, a recording after
the elapse of this period but before bankruptcy will make it necessary for
the trustee to resort to Section 60 unless there exists a creditor who had
fixed a lien on the property before the recordation date, in which case the
trustee can take his place and overthrow the claim.44
Universal Credit Co. v. Finn, 212 Wis. 601, 250 N. W. 391 (1933) (notice to
creditor not equivalent to filing under § 14 of Uniform Conditional Sales Act);
Thayer Mercantile Co. v. First National Bank, 98 N. J. L. 29, 19 At. 94 (1922);
Banks-Miller Supply Co. v. Bank, 106 W. Va. 523, 146 S. E. 521 (1929) (notice
to creditor equivalent to filing).
41. In re Peairs Lynch Stone Co., 45 F. Supp. 992 (W. D. Mo. 1942) (con-
ditional sales vendor knew or later acquired knowledge of removal of crusher from
Arkansas, where such contracts need not be recorded, to Nebraska, where recording
is required. Held, having failed to record in Nebraska the trustee could assert
a lien superior to seller's claim under contract. The court said the lien having
been contracted four months before bankruptcy the vendor could have filed the
contract for record in Nebraska within four months of bankruptcy. Presumably
only a reasonable time would be allowed. The decision was properly based on
the lien given the trustee by § 70 (c).). See note 22 supra.
42. § 14. The following jurisdictions have enacted the Uniform Act: Alaska,
Arizona, Delaware, Indiana (substantially), New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws (1941) at 335.
43. § 44. Only Indiana has adopted the Uniform Act. HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1941) at
335.
44. Resort to § 60 was generally necessary also if possession was obtained
by the mortgagee or vendor prior to the filing of the petition subject to the quali-
fication above. For the right of the trustee to take the place of a creditor who had
fixed a lien before this time see discussion supra.
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CONDITIONAL SALES
Similar problems are presented with respect to conditional sales. In
those states where such contracts are dealt with under the mortgage
theory,45 the same construction should apply to both mortgages and condi-
tional sales. In those states which deal with them under the title theory,
the effect of the Act remains unascertained. 4 ' Although title to the property
has never resided in the debtor, he has the same interest in it before recorda-
tion of the contract as he has in the case of a mortgage. He may pass title to
a bona fide purchaser,47 and lien creditors are able to subject it to their
claims.48 Recordation of the contract would appear, then, to constitute a
transfer of this interest or the fixing of a lien on the property. Where the
contract was made some time before but not recorded until within the four
month period, it would appear to be equally "for or on account of an
antecedent debt," and the other requisites present a voidable preference.
There is support for this in the legislative history of the Act.
EQUITABLE PLEDGE
Under the now outmoded "relation back" doctrine, an equitable pledgee4"
who took possession within the four month period was able to refer his pos-
45. E.g. TEX. REv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 5489; see Note (1933) 83
A. L. R. 1279.
46. Under the strict view, exemplified in Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Com-
pany, 239 U. S. 268 (1915), the property never having been in the vendee a recorda-
tion within the four month period could not be a transfer of the bankrupt's prop-
erty. If the doctrine of that case is applied to the new wording of the section,
then conditional sales contracts will be excluded from its operation.
47. Practically" all the states that require recordation protect a bona fide
purchaser when the contract is not recorded. The state statutes are compiled in
3 JONES, op. cit. supra note 13, §§ 1008-1056; Id. (1940 Supp.) §§ 1008-1056. See
also UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES ACT § 4.
48. Under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, § 5, the creditor must levy
on or attach the goods without notice of the terms of the sale before he can de-
feat the vendor's retained title. Filing within ten days protects the vendor against
creditors of the vendee. Assuming that under state law an unfiled chattel mortgage
or conditional sales contract is good except against attaching creditors and bonafide purchasers, an argument could be made that they may be perfected as stat-
utory liens under 67 (b) within four months of bankruptcy or even after the
filing of the petition. The legislative history of Section 60 (supra note 17) and the
wording of Section 67 (b) (supra note 23) rather obviously indicates, however,
that 67 (b) has no reference to security transfers. This inquiry is nevertheless
suggested by White v. Karl Kiefer Machine Co., 127 F. (2d) 119 (C. C. A. 8th,
1942).
49. The equitable pledge is an outgrowth of the legal pledge and differs
only in that in the former possession is retained by the pledgor. Yt has found
great favor with business men. RESTATEMENT, SECURITY (1941) § 10. A pledge
imperfect due to want of delivery gives rise to an equitable lien. Goldstein v.
Rusch, 56 F. (2d) 10 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); Murry v. Central Bank, 226 Mo. App.
(Vol.
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session back to the time of the original agreement. 50 This seems to have been
but another example of the relaxation of the rule requiring possession or
delivery for a valid pledge.' By this device an equitable pledgee who obtained
possession within the period acquired a legal pledge as of the date of the
agreement. Such interpretation expanded the ever increasing fields in which
use of the equitable pledge was finding favor. The pledgee obtained all the
protection of a valid pledge52 without attendant difficulties. The debt was
secured, and yet the debtor left the free use of the property by means of
which payment was more readily assured. The business advantages to both
were accordingly great. Another use to which this device was put was the
taking of possession of a chattel before bankruptcy by a mortgagee who had
failed to record.5 3 By the new Act the date on which possession is obtained
or when it will stand as against creditors and innocent purchasers governs
rather than the time of the original agreement. If possession is not transferred
then, the transfer is considered to have been perfected immediately before
bankruptcy for the purposes of subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 60.
400, 40 S. W. (2d) 721 (1931). An agreement that creates an equitable pledge
must relate to specific property. Mechanics' and Metals' National Bank of the
City of N. Y. v. Ernst, 231 U. S. 60 (1913); GLENN op. cit. supra note 8, § 483.
50. Sexton v. Kessler and Co., Ltd., 225 U. S. 90 (1912); Humphrey v.
Tatman, 198 U. S. 91 (1905); Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516 (1905);
Tobin v. Insurance Agency Co., 80 F. (2d) 241 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935); Johnson v.
Burke Manor Building Corp., 48 F. (2d) 1031 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931); Jordan v.
Greenwood, 23 F. (2d) 506 (D. Me. 1928). Contra: In re Herkimer Mills Co.,
Inc., 39 F. (2d) 625 (N. D. N. Y. 1930). ,
51. Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand, 206 U. S. 415 (1907); Sammett v.
Mayer, 108 F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939; In re Spanish-American Cork Products
Co., 2 F. (2d) 203 (C. C. A. 4th, 1924). It was not long before the inexpediency
of such a strict rule manifested itself, and as a result legal pledges of intangibles
represented by indispensable documents were allowed. Goldstein v. Rusch, 56 F.
(2d) 10 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 604 (1932); Clarke v. Chap-
man, 215 Mich. 518, 184 N. W. 497 (1921). See Note (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 621.
52. As long as it was simply an equitable pledge the pledgee assumed the
risk of his rights being subordinated to an intervening bona fide purchaser from
the pledgor or attaching or levying creditors who became creditors of the pledgor
without notice of the equitable interest. RESTATEMENT, SECURITY (1941) § 10,
There seems to be little authority that the levying creditor with notice will be
subordinate to the pledgee. See Note (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 621, 624, n. 21. Con-
trast the rule of the Restatement with the rule of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act
§ 8, subd. 3) and of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (§ 5) protecting the
entrustor or vendor as against levying or attaching creditors with notice.
53. Thus a conditional sales vendor or chattel mortgagee could head off
creditors by taking possession of the security prior to an attachment or judgment.
The transaction was then turned into a pledge, with pledgee in possession, and the
security device lost its original nature and presented only the case of a contract
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Thus, to establish a voidable preference it would be necessary for the trustee
to show the pledgee had "reasonable cause" to believe the debtor insolvent at
the time the transfer was perfected. But if possession has not actually been
transferred before the date of the petition, the trustee can probably prevail
by virtue of his status under Section 70 (c) without resort to Section 60.1
The validity of a pledge being solely a matter of state law, a statute passed
by the state making an equitable pledge, in effect, a valid legal pledge as of
the date of the original agreement or one limiting the rights of a bona fide
purchaser and lien creditor against an equitable pledgee, would suffice to
effect a reaffirmation of this device.
One other matter should be mentioned. The bankruptcy amendment
will most effectually strike down a doctrine that heretofore has been capable
of great elasticity according to the judicial inclination. The rule referred
to is the one permitting a pledgor to have possession of the security for tem-
porary and limited purposes, a rule which is so well settled that it found its
way into the Security Restatement.5 If the return of possession to the
pledgor was kept well within the purpose of this rule, the pledgee was pro-
tected against attaching creditors of the pledgor and formerly, at least,
against his trustee in bankruptcy.56 Never, however, was such protection
extended as against a bona fide purchaser from the pledgor.'7 It would cer-
54. See note 22 supra.
55. RESTATEMENT, SECURITY (1941) § 11. The purpose must relate to the
maintenance of the value of the pledgee's interest and have to do with the pro-
tection, improvement or sale of the chattel, or where the chattel is an instrument
or document, its handling or collection.
56. Sexton v. Kessler and Co., Ltd., 225 U. S. 90 (1912). As to judgment
or attaching creditors, see Hulton v. Arnett, 51 Ill. 198 (1869); Hilliker v. Kuhn,
71 Cal. 214, 16 Pac. 707 (1886); Clare v. Agerter, 47 Kan. 604, 28 Pac. 694 (1892).
As to trustee in bankruptcy, see Sexton v. Kessler and Co., Ltd., supra; Petition
of Chattanooga Savings Bank, 261 Fed. 116 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919). In this connec-
tion the distinction between the temporary return for limited purposes of a pledged
article to the pledgor and the surrender of possession by a possessory lienor should
be noted. The lienor will generally retain a legal interest good against everyone
if he is involuntarily deprived of possession while a voluntary surrender will destroy
the lien so far as creditors and purchasers from the bailor are concerned. If sur-
rendered under circumstances imposing an obligation on the bailor to return it,
the lienor can recover the chattel from the bailor and others except a bona fide
purchaser for value and an officer of the law who has levied on or attached the
chattel at the instance of one who has become a creditor without notice of the
lienor's interest. RESTATEMENT, SECURITY (1941) § 80.
57. RESTATEMENT, SECURITY (1941) § 11, comment c; Walker v. Staples,
5 Allen 34 (Mass. 1862); Stockyards Nat. Bank of St. Paul, Minn. v. First Nat.
Bank of Towner, N. D., 249 Fed. 421 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918). If, however, the
conjunctive "and" is given its literal interpretation, the return for the limited
period would be good against creditors and hence the trustee. This is true, of
course, of many of the situations discussed previously.
[Vol. 8
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tainly seem, therefore, that under the new Act the pledgee will receive no
protection as against the trustee in bankruptcy of the pledgor. The trustee
will, however, have to establish "reasonable cause" on the pledgee's part
at the time the transfer is perfected by the Act, immediately before bank-
ruptcy. A state statute could, of course, by limiting the rights of a bona
fide purchaser, reinstate the practice of returning goods for such purposes
with as great a degree of protection as formerly had.
INTANGIBLES
There has long been a conflict in the states with respect to whether
or not a subsequent assignee of an account receivable who first gives notice
to the debtor will be preferred over a prior assignee. A long line of deci-
sions has followed the English rule preferring the subsequent assignee in this
situation" s while many other jurisdictions have refused to do so.5 9 The
recent trend is probably toward the latter view.60 In all jurisdictions the as-
signment is valid as between the parties without notice to the debtor. Under
the old Bankruptcy Act it was, of course, immaterial which of these views
was followed. The measurement of the trustee's rights by the status of a
bona fide purchaser under Section 60 will now make an assignment not fol-
lowed by notice until within four months of bankruptcy a preference in
those jurisdictions having the English rule.61 In jurisdictions not following
58. Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 475 (Ch. 1827) is the leading
case setting down this rule. The most recent decisions following it are: In re Quaker
City Sheet Metal Co., 129 F. (2d) 894 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) aff'd sub nom. Coin
Exchange National Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder, 11 U. S. LAw WEEK 4242
(U. S. 1943), and In re Seim Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 855 (D. Md. 1941).
See Notes (1934) 31 A. L. R. 876; (1937) 110 A. L. R. 774 for decisions in Cali-
fornia, District of Columbia, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont and Virginia.
59. Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182 (1924)
(not controlling on states in view of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins). See Notes cited
supra note 58 for decisions to this effect in Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York,
Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, West Virginia and other federal courts. New Jersey
and Iowa in later decisions repudiated the rule of Dearle v. Hall supra note 58,
e.g., Moorestown Trust Co. v. Buzby, 109 N. J. Eq. 409, 157 Atl. 663 (1932);
Ottumwa Boiler Works v. O'Meara and Son, 206 Iowa 577, 218 N. W. 920 (1928).
For an explanation of these opposing views, see Neuhoff, Assignments of Accounts
Receivable as Affected by the Chandler Act (1940) 34 ILL. L. REv. 538; Hamilton,
The Effect of Section Sixty of the Bankruptcy Act upon Assignments of Accounts
Receivable (1939) 26 VA. L. REv. 168.
60. See Notes supra note 58. This is the view set forth in RESTATEMENT,
CoNTRAcTs (1932) § 173.
61. In re Quaker Sheet Metal Co., 129 F. (2d) 894 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942)
supra note 15; In re Seim Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 855 (D. Md. 1941). In
order to avoid the preference the trustee will have to show reasonable cause on
the assignee's part to believe the assignor insolvent at the time of notice to the
1943]
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the English rule it would seem necessary, however, for the first assignee, in
order to preserve his rights, to give notice to the debtor because: "What-
ever view may be entertained as to the English doctrine which prefers the
assignee who first gives notice, the second assignee [assuming that he paid
value in good faith for his assignment, or that if a volunteer, he took in
good faith, and the first assignee also was a volunteer] is in several con-
tingencies clearly entitled to supplant the first assignee, e.g., (1) if acting
in good faith he obtains payment of the claim assigned; or, (2) if he reduces
his claim to a judgment in his own name; or, (3) if he effects a novation
with the obligor, whereby the obligation in favor of the assignor is super-
seded by a new one running to himself, or, (4) if he obtains the document
containing the obligation when the latter is in the form of a specialty. In
all these cases, having obtained a legal right in good faith and for value, the
prior assignee cannot properly deprive him of his legal right." 2
Thus, irrespective of whether or not a jurisdiction adheres to the Eng-
lish view, it may be necessary for an assignee to give notice to the obligor.
Otherwise jurisdictions recognizing any of these rules will prefer subsequent
assignees who do those things, and this mere possibility may render an as-
signment imperfect right down to immediately before bankruptcy, at which
time it is perfected by virtue of Section 60.3 Being within the four month
debtor, or if notice is not given when the transfer is perfected by Section 60, imme-
diately before bankruptcy.
62. 2 WILLISTON, CoNRaAcrs (rev. ed. 1938) § 435, at page 1260. For
authorities supporting these exceptions see cases cited by Williston in the notes
to this quotation, and Id. (Supp. 1940) § 435. See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS(1932) § 173. A recent case opposed to this view is State Factors Corporation v.
Sales Factors Corp., 257 App. Div. 101, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 12 (1st Dep't. 1939).(Failure of assignee of accounts receivable to give notice to debtor does not affect
his right to recover from subsequent assignee who collected in good faith from
debtors.) It must be admitted that the bankruptcy cases that have arisen involving
such assignments have not considered these possibilities at all. See In re .Quaker
City Sheet Metal Co., 129 F. (2d) 894 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) aff'd sub vom. Corn Ex-
change National Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder, 11 U. S. LAw WEEK 4242 (U. S.
1943) cited supra note 15; Rockmore v. Lehman, 129 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942);
Schwartz v. Horowitz, 131 F. (2d) 506 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); Associated Seed
Growers, Inc. v. Geib, 125 F. (2d) 683 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942) cited supra note 15;
Swetnam v. Wright Ginsburg Corp., 128 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) cert. denied,
63 .S. Ct. 42 (1942); In re Seim Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 855 (D. Md. 1941)
cited supra note 15.
63. The possibility also exists that a creditor of the assignor may garnishee
the debt due from the obligor to the assignor. If notice of the assignment is not
given to the obligor and he has no reason to know of it he will be discharged from
his duty to the assignee if the creditor obtains judgment against him. RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 172. This possibility of a creditor obtaining superior
rights to the assignee would also seem to render the assignment imperfect.
[Vol. 8
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period, and also for an antecedent debt, it will constitute a preference void-
able by the trustee if the assignee at that time has reasonable cause to
believe the assignor insolvent.
Other problems arise in the case of pledges of future accounts and in
situations involving returned goods. With respect to the former it is clear
that the substitution of one account for another is permissible." The greatest
problem seems to center around the use of the proceeds of the sale, or col-
lection of the already pledged account. 5 Where the pledgor has been given
absolute control over the use of the proceeds it has generally been held in-
valid as against the trustee in bankruptcy. 6 In New York some act must
be done after the account comes into existence before the pledge is com-
plete. In Okin v. Isaac Goldman Co.,67 the court said "the rule6" does not
apply as against a trustee in bankruptcy or execution creditor to either
personal chattels or to choses in action when they are subject to sale or use
by the assignor in his business."
The collection of the proceeds by the assignor will not, however, in-
validate the assignee's lien so long as an accounting is made to the as-
signee."" Heretofore the validity of the pledge of "returned goods" hinged
on the extent of the power of the borrower to dispose of the goods or the
proceeds of their sale and the necessity of consulting or accounting to the
lender. Where returned goods are included in the agreement as part of the
security there is a true equitable pledge.70 These two fundamental security
devices likewise face a material disembodiment in many states unless the
"relation back" doctrine be in effect reestablished by new legislation.
64. E.g., Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353 (1925); Okin v. Isaac Goldman
Co., 79 F. (2d) 317 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Manufacturers Finance Co. v. Armstrong,
78 F. (2d) 289 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); In re Vanity Fair Slippers, Inc., 4 F. Supp.
83 (S. D. N. Y. 1933). In New York such a lien is generally held to take effect
when the future chose in action becomes the property of the promisor, Central
Trust Co. of New York v. West India Improvement Co., 169 N. Y. 314, 62 N. E.
387, 391 (1901). Cf. Barnes v. Alexander, 232 U. S. 117 (1914).
65. Miller, An Assignment of Accounts Receivable as a Security Device(1937) 22 MA9. L. R51. 28.
66. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353 (1925); Irving Trust Co. v. Finance
Service Co., 63 F. (2d) 694 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co.,
38 F. (2d) 45 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
67. 79 F. (2d) 317, 319 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
68. See note 64 supra.
69. Manufacturers Finance Co. v. Armstrong, 78 F. (2d) 289 (C. C. A.
4th, 1935).
70. Sammett v. Mayer, 108 F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939); Goldstein v.
Rusch, 56 F. (2d) 10 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); In re Bernard & Katz, Inc., 38 F. (2d)
40 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
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FREE-HANDED MORTGAGES
Most American jurisdictions afford no protection to a 'mortgagee of
a stock of goods where the mortgagor is allowed to retain possession and
to offer them for sale in the usual course of business. 71 This holds true
regardless of whether or not the mortgage is recorded.72 The policy back
of such stringency is the interest in protecting creditors who transact busi-
ness with the mortgagor relying upon the mortgagor's possession of a stock
of goods as security for the amounts due them. A minority of jurisdictions,
following the lead of Michigan, accords fully validity and effect to stock
in trade mortgages, holding superior the mortgagee's rights to the claims
of creditors.73 A few jurisdictions, however, take the position that the
mortgage is ineffectual to create a lien only with respect to the stock acquired
subsequent to execution of the "mortgage, but that it is valid as to existing
stock.74 In a number of the states that hold such a mortgage is invalid
as to creditors the courts have held that if the mortgagee obtains possession
of the goods after default under the terms of the mortgage and prior to
the acquisition of liens by creditors, his position is superior to that of
general creditors.75 Massachusetts has adopted a theory that such a device
gives the mortgagee a right in the nature of an equitable lien and is valid
provided possession is taken before bankruptcy or attachment. 0 Reposses-
71. See Cohen and Gerber, Mortgages of Merchandise (1939) 39 CoL. L.
REv. 1338.
72. E.g., Freeman v. Rawson, 5 Ohio St. 1 (1855); Turk v. Kramer, 138
Okla. 35, 280 Pac. 266 (1929). See also Note (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 1338, 1339
n. 5.
73. Gay v. Bidwell, 7 Mich. 519 (1859); Johnson v. Patterson, 13 Fed. Cas.
780, No. 7403 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1875). See also Ga. Code (1933) §§ 67-103 and
Note (1939) 39 COL. L. REv. 1338, 1342 n. 18.
74. Vogler, Wagner & Co. v. Smith, 10 Ky. L. Rep. 364 (1888) (valid as
to existing stock); Sandy Valley Grocery Co. v. Patrick, 267 Ky. 768, 103 S. W.
(2d) 307 (1937) (invalid as to after-acquired stock); Williams v. Noyes & Nutter
Mfg. Co., 112 Me. 408, 92 At. 482 (1914); First Nat. Bank of Baltimore v.
Lindenstruth, 79 Md. 136, 28 At. 807 (1894); Zartman v. First Nat. Bank of
Waterloo, 189 N. Y. 267, 82 N: E. "127 (1907).
75. Kettenbach v. Walker, 32 Idaho 544, 186 Pac. 912 (1919); South-
western Port Huron Co. v. Carraker, 133 Ill. App. 245 (1907); Barton v. Sitling-
ton, 128 Mo. 164, 30 S. W. 514 (1895); Chaffee v. Atlas Lumber Co., 43 Neb. 224,
61 N. W. 637 (1895); Francisco v. Ryan, 54 Ohio St. 307, 43 N. E. 1045 (1896);
Snow v. Cody, 96 Okla. 81, 220 Pac. 578 (1923); First Nat. Bank of Burns v.
Frazier, 143 Ore. 662, 22 P. (2d) 325 (1933); Cook & Co. v. Corthell, 11 R. I. 482
(1877); Ayers, Weatherwax & Reid Co. v. Sundback, 5 S. D. 31, 58 N. W. 4
(1894).
76. Chase v. Denny, 130 Mass. 566 (1881). In re Markert, 45 F. Supp. 661
(D. Mass. 1942) (taking of possession of after-acquired property under recorded
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sion in these latter states would not, it would seem, be related back to the
date of the original agreement under present Section 60 of the Bankruptcy
Act. State legislation could, as in the case of the pledge, relate possession
back to the date of the original agreement. In the states that invalidate
such a mortgage the Chandler Act makes no change, for the trustee always
could recover the property. There is the additional difficulty in all these
cases, however, that a bona fde purchaser in the ordinary course of busi-
ness obtains good title to the goods. It is quite possible the Act might be
so interpreted that such mortgages could never be perfected, for such goods
are for sale and there can always be a bona fide purchaser who can obtain
superior rights to the mortgagee.7 7  A similar problem arises, of course,
in the case of trust receipts where the goods can be sold by the trustee in
the ordinary course of business. 8 It is reasonable, it would seem, to hold,
however, that as the mortgagee or entrustor in these cases took his security
with sales (in the ordinary course of business) in- mind, what interest was
conveyed to him (an interest subject to the rights of purchasers in ihe
ordinary course of business) is perfected, and the possibility of a purchaser
in the ordinary course of business obtaining the goods is irrelevant. It is
otherwise, of course, where creditors or purchasers out of the ordinary
business can obtain superior rights because here they are definitely infring-
ing on the interest sought to be conveyed to him. In the latter situation
the transfer is not perfected until it is good as against such parties.
AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY
The operation and validity of an after-acquired property clause in a
mortgage has been the subject of countless discourses and numerous arti-
cles.70 Equity at an early date permitted such mortgages.80 Today such
free handed mortgage on stock of merchandise by mortgagee two days before bank-
ruptcy constituted, other requisites being present, a voidable preference). It has
been pointed out that in Massachusetts possession under such a mortgage must
be taken by the mortgagee to perfect his title as against attaching creditors and
purchasers.
77. Of course for the purposes of subdivisions (a) and (b) of § 60 it will be
perfected immediately before bankruptcy.
78. The Uniform Act provides a thirty day period of validity for the en-
trustor's security interest without filing (§ 8 (1)) but, irrespective of filing, full
protection is accorded a "buyer in the ordinary course of trade" (§ 9 (2) (a)).
79. See Note (1935) 7 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 264, n. 1.
80. Holroyd v. Marshall, 10 H. L. Cas. 191 (1861); Mitchell v. Winslow,
17 Fed. Cas. 527, No. 9673 (C. C. D. Me. 1843).
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a mortgage, if recorded, is superior to the claims of subsequent purchasers 8'
and creditorss2 in some states. In some states possession by the mortgagee
before the claims of purchasers or lien creditors accrue will be superior, but
otherwise the mortgagee will not be protected even though he has recorded. 8
Under this rule the Chandler Act would make preferences the title of
mortgagees who have taken possession within four months of the petition.0'
As the great majority of jurisdictions do not protect the mortgagee even
when the mortgage is recorded as against one or the other of these groups,
it would seem that as to after-acquired property the security will not be
perfected (in the absence of possession being taken) for the purposes of Sec-
tion 60 until immediately before bankruptcy.83 If possession has been taken
and there is no lien creditor whose place the trustee is entitled to take, the
trustee must rely on Section 60. If possession has not been taken and such
clauses are no protection against creditors, the trustee will prevail by virtue
of the status conferred on hirm- by Section 70 (c). 80
TRuST RECEIPTS
The general rule, in jurisdictions not having the Uniform Act, upholds
the validity of only the tripartite arrangement without the necessity of filing.8T
A few jurisdictions require recording of both bipartite and tripartite trust
transactions. 8  In some jurisdictions the status of the trust receipt still re-
mains undetermined. 89 The Uniform Act validates both tripartite and
81. Loupee v. Mich. Cent. R. R., 243 Mich. 144, 219 N. W. 727 (1928);
Bonneville Lumber Co. v. Peppard Seed Co., 72 Utah 463, 271 Pac. 226 (1928).
82. Waters v. Ellington & Co., 289 S. W. 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Smith-
hurst v. Edmunds, 14 N. J. Eq. 408 (Ch. 1862).
83. E.g., Wasserman v. McDonnell, 190 Mass. 326, 76 N. E. 959, 960 (1906).
See also Cohen & Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause (1939) 87 U. oF PA.
L. REv. 635, 639.
84. Assuming of course a lapse -of time sufficiently great between the loan
and taking possession so as to make it a transfer for an antecedent debt.
85. And then only for the purposes of this Section.
86. See note 22 supra.
87. 1 JoNEs, CHATrEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES (6th ed. 1933)
§ 33e, p. 60. See also Note (1933) 17 MINN. L. REv. 790, 792 n. 9.
88. Michigan, Wisconsin and Kentucky have held that trust receipts should
be recorded as chattel mortgages: Motor Bankers' Corp. v. C. I. T. Corp. 258
Mich. 301, 241 N. W. 911 (1932); Matter of Lee, 6 A. B. R. (N. S.) 437 (Dist.
Ct. Wis. 1923); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sharp Motor Sales Co., 233
Ky. 290, 293 (1930). In some instances they have been held to be conditional
sales, and to require filing as such: General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry,
195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E. 767 (1928); Central Acceptance Corp. v. Lynch, 58 F.
(2d) 915 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); Industrial Finance Corp. v. Capplemann, 284 Fed.
8 (C. C. A. 4th, 1922).
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bipartite trust receipt transactions but requires filing in case the goods are
to be held by the borrower for substantial periods of time.90 To the extent
that recording is required the transaction will be governed precisely the same
as chattel mortgages or conditional sales contracts discussed previously. How-
ever, even under the Uniform Act a purchaser in the ordinary course of
business from a borrower with unlimited power of sale gets title free of the
trust receipt, regardless of filing."1 And even though the sale violates the
limited authority of the borrower, only actual knowledge of the limitation on
the part of the purchaser will affect his title.92 In these situations it is accord-
ingly possible for a bova fide purchaser to obtain superior rights to the
entrustor, and a literal interpretation of Section 60 might render the en-
trustor's security imperfect down to immediately before bankruptcy. It is
possible to argue that as the interest conveyed to the entrustor did not seek
to embrace protection against such purchasers, the probability of such pur-
chasers is irrelevant as they do not divest and render imperfect an interest
he did not have or intend to have. Where the trustee has no such power of
sale and a purchaser nevertheless obtains superior rights, this argument would
not apply. An interpretation of the Chandler Act to invalidate these trans-
actions would seem undesirable but in any case would leave the way open
for appropriate state legislation changing the status of the entrustor in these
situations. -
CONCLUSION
No attempt has been made t6 cover all the situations in which different
security devices may be jeopardized with respect to bankruptcy because of
the possibility that the transfer will not be regarded as complete as against
90. By § 8 (1) the lender is protected in his trust receipt security for thirty
days without filing. After thirty days the trust receipt is invalid against lien
creditors who have obtained a lien without actual notice if (a) the trust receipt
was not filed or (b) the lender did not take possession before the acquisition of the
lien (§ 8 (2)). Creditors who have acquired their claims by processing, ware-
housing or shipping goods held under a trust receipt are superior to the lender to
the extent of their liens (§ 11). A purchaser out of the ordinary course of business,
including a chattel mortgagee, a pledgee, a buyer in bulk, takes subject even to
an unfiled trust receipt, except in the case of a mortgagee or pledgee for new
value who obtains possession prior to filing (§ 9 (2) (b)). See HANNA, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON SECuRrry (2d ed. 1940) 237. The following jurisdictions have
adopted the Uniform Act: California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Tennessee. HADBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1941) at 339.
91. Section 9 (2) (1).
92. Section 9 (2) (ii).
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creditors and bona fide purchasers. A sufficient number have been indicated
to show that a strict interpretation of Section 60 may endanger the usefulness
and value of many of them perhaps not contemplated by the framers of the
Act. It has been pointed out in this connection, however, that while the
American Bar Association members and bankers' counsel, who might have
been expected to guard the rights of secured creditors, were represented at
the National Bankruptcy Conference, the actual drafting of the Act was
entrusted to a group little inclined by predilection or self-interest to a sym-
pathetic understanding of the legitimate protection to which security interests
are entitled in bankruptcy.93 It should not be forgotten that the constitution-
al authority of Congress in bankruptcy matters is itself subject to the Fifth
Amendment.9 Since an interpretation of an ambiguous statute is favored
which keeps it within constitutional limits, it is possible that this considera-
tion will influence the'courts in restricting the scope of the literal words of
Section 60. Then, too, the interpretation to be ascribed to the word "and"
may assume decisive importance.9 5
If a literal interpretation of the Act is regarded as unduly destructive of
legitimate security interests, as it would seem, it would probably be more
desirable to have the Act amended rather than to await a slow and tedious
construction of the Act by the Supreme Court. Even under a literal inter-
pretation, however, it is still open to the states to declare their own social
policy by defining the status of creditors and bona fide purchasers. State
action will probably await construction of the Act by the Supreme Court.
93. Hanna, Some Unsolved Problems under Section 6 0a of the Bankruptcy
Act (1943) 43 CoL. L. REv. 58, 60.
94. In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935),
the Supreme Court decided the interests of a secured creditor had been uncon-
stitutionally invaded because the first Frazier-Lemke Act sought to take from it
substantive interests in specified property acquired by the creditor under the law
of Kentucky. The constitutionality of the second Frazier-Lemke Act was sustained
in Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300 U. S.
440 (1937).
95. See supra note 26.
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